Papers by Himal Trikha
Religionen Unterwegs 29.1, pp. 12-18, 2023
Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies 58, 2021
Draft of article forthcoming in: (Non) Violence in Jaina Philosophy, Literature and Art. Ed. By P. Flügel.
The paper examines an aspect of the Jaina doctrine of yonis ("place of birth/origin"), namely, th... more The paper examines an aspect of the Jaina doctrine of yonis ("place of birth/origin"), namely, that their number would, in total, comprise eighty-four "hundred-thousand" (Hindi: lākh, English: lakh). The doctrine is of relevance up to the present day, as it enumerates all life forms recognized in the Jaina cosmos, i.e., the totality of possible objects for (a)hiṃsā. The first part of the paper assembles (1.1) attestations for this doctrine in literatures of the Digambaras; (1.2) the Śvetāmbaras; and (1.3) other South Asian ascetic traditions. The second part consists of (2.1) a timeline for the Jaina attestations; (2.2) the discussion of alternatives for the age of the doctrine; (2.3) hypotheses on the history of its development; and (2.4) an analysis of the discussion of the doctrine in early Digambara commentaries on the Tattvārthasūtra.
The "growing interest in Jainism and … the increasing number of publications on the Jain traditio... more The "growing interest in Jainism and … the increasing number of publications on the Jain tradition" (Flügel 2005: 8) has had little efect on stimulating philological studies on Jaina philosophy. Despite outstanding research activities in various areas of Jaina studies, few philologists focus on Jaina philosophical literature, works or concepts per se. 1 Current "trends in Jain studies" (Balbir 2014) include textual studies pertaining to the religious and narrative literature, the study of middle Indian languages, studies of Jaina art or sociological and anthropological studies. 2 Except for a few extensive and systematical studies, 3 recent philological research on Jaina philosophy mostly focuses on selected issues, 4 on the examination of selected arguments in a wider context 5 or on the collection of results from earlier research periods. In the following I present an overview of major trends of research on a segment of Jaina philosophical literature, i.e., the Sanskrit writings of authors from the 5th to the 15th centuries, who used a characteristic terminology pertaining to principles of the scholarly debate (vāda) and to the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa).
Preprint version of an article to be published in:
Proceedings of DOT 2013, Panel: “Adaptive Re... more Preprint version of an article to be published in:
Proceedings of DOT 2013, Panel: “Adaptive Reuse of Texts, Ideas and Images”. Ed. by Elisa Freschi and Philipp Maas (forthcoming 2015).
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this p... more The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
Book and Theses by Himal Trikha
This book explores the pluralistic epistemological model of a tenth-century South Asian philosoph... more This book explores the pluralistic epistemological model of a tenth-century South Asian philosopher and emphasizes the vital role of critique for establishing pluralism on rational grounds.
The focus of the book is a text section from the Sanskrit work Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā, in which the Jaina scholar Vidyānandin discusses tenets of the Vaiśeṣika, a brahminical philosophical tradition. Vidyānandin refutes the Vaiśeṣika tenets by way of a systematic deconstruction of a key concept in the Vaiśeṣika ontological system, namely, the concept of inherence (samavāya).
In the first part of the book, Vidyānandin’s uncompromising criticism of the Vaiśeşika is taken as an example for philosophical approaches to competing world views and examined in the context of the classical Jaina theory of manifoldness (anekāntavāda). Through the systematic differentiation of several forms of perspectivism it is shown that Vidyānandin’s edifice of thought offers a narrow path between relativism and dogmatism: It represents a form of epistemic pluralism, in which the identification of erroneous epistemic alternatives plays a crucial role for the establishment of valid epistemic alternatives.
The second and third parts of the book contain a critical text and an extensively annotated translation of the text selection from the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. Vidyānandin’s arguments are examined against the backdrop of closely related passages from other Sanskrit works of the classical and medieval periods. The methodical analysis of these passages and the determination of their place in the argumentation’s structure allow for the identification of different layers of the text’s composition and reveal Vidyānandin’s specific contribution in a discourse that spanned centuries.
Orders: http://www.istb.univie.ac.at/cgi-bin/sdn/sdn.cgi?order_form=1
Reviews:
J. Soni: Journal of the American Oriental Society 132.4 (2012) p. 695-697.
J.D. Long: Religious Studies Review 39.3 (2013) p. 194.
L. den Boer: Bulletin d’Études Indiennes 31 (2013) p. 267-272.
J. Taber: Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies 55 (2013-2014 [2015]) p. 260-262.
Find table of contents and reading extracts below.
Dissertation thesis 2009, published with minor changes as monograph "Perspektivismus und Kritik" ... more Dissertation thesis 2009, published with minor changes as monograph "Perspektivismus und Kritik" in 2012. Page numbers of thesis and monograph do not match.
Diploma thesis 1999, unpublished.
Talks by Himal Trikha
Conference "My, your, our reason", 2025
This digital item stores (1) conference information (2) projected slides and (3) text of Trikha's... more This digital item stores (1) conference information (2) projected slides and (3) text of Trikha's talk at the conference "My, your, our reason", Vienna 2025.
The German talk starts with the question: which forms of false knowledge are permitted in a pluralistic model? In this context, two approaches of Jaina perspectivism will be presented. Firstly, an approach that is prominent today and takes up a pre-classical pattern of reasoning, and secondly, a reflected approach by which the Jainas sought to assert themselves in classical discourses.
Both approaches have in common that false knowledge is addressed as ‘one-sided’ knowledge, but one-sidedness is conceptualised differently. Firstly, one-sided cognition is understood as incomplete cognition that articulates one of several possible epistemic standpoints. It is possible in princple to correct such incomplete perspectives by including other points of view. In the second approach, however, one-sidedness is understood as invalid cognition that infers the nature of a thing on the basis of certain properties, i.e., the inauthentic is misunderstood as the essence here. Such a view cannot be corrected, but must be rejected. The establishment of such a type of misconception brings us back to the basis of ‘our reason’, because in order to clarify the status of an individual insight, we do not have to hope for future rectification, but can decide here and now whether the claim to validity of a particular perspective is rationally reasonable or not.
In both approaches, perspectivity is understood as a basic attribute of human cognition. Therefore, talking about perspectivity here is synonymous with the call to look out for other possible perspectives. In the first approach, further points of view must be sought in order to supplement incomplete perspectives. In the second approach, alternatives to viewpoints that have been exposed as inadequate must be sought in order to be able to articulate the assumed actual state of things. Both approaches were very fruitful for Jaina thought. The first, because the Jainas collected alternative philosophical positions like no other tradition in South Asia and thus preserved them for us later generations; the second, because the attempt to refute opposing positions left numerous non-falsified counter-concepts, which are combined in a world view that includes several points of view. My interpretation of this very dynamic form of perspectivism is as follows: against the background of certain ontological presuppositions, mutually exclusive alternatives are 1) collected, 2) subjected to attempts at falsification and 3) the counterpart to a falsified alternative is set as a valid perspective beside others, to which the same procedure has been applied.
Jaina epistemology distinguishes two types of valid cognitive processes, conclusive (→ pramāṇa) a... more Jaina epistemology distinguishes two types of valid cognitive processes, conclusive (→ pramāṇa) and inconclusive (→ naya). Such a distinction allows for the conception of epistemic situations, where numerous cognitions provide adequate epistemic access to an object. Conflicting views may converge in a wider vision, i.e., epistemic alternatives that at first seem to be dissonant may appear as consonant, when their restricted scope is revealed by and integrated within a complete vision of an object at hand. Many Jaina authors have used, and still use, this epistemological model for attempts to show that their concept of reality represents such a total vision and that other traditions of thought operate with inconclusive views only. However, under the conditions of a rational discourse the total vision, i.e., a privileged epistemic stance has to be suspended and is virtually absent. Under such conditions, a plurality of epistemic alternatives for a single object implies that the status of validity for individual cognitive acts is unclear. An individual cognition might represent valid epistemic access-be it conclusive or inconclusive-but it could also simply be wrong. The rational strategies to identify the status of individual epistemic alternatives are basically of two kinds, verification and falsification, i.e., the argumentation for and the argumentation against the validity of a particular cognitive act. For the pluralist verification means to provide arguments that a particular epistemic event is consonant with other alternatives and thus an integrative part of a more complete view. Interestingly enough, such an argumentation strategy is hard to come by in classical Jaina Sanskrit literature. To my knowledge, it is rarely explicated how, e.g., a particular tenet of a philosophical opponent would be consistent with the Jaina view. To the contrary, Jaina philosophers devote most of their energy to show meticulously how particular philosophical tenets are to be regarded as completely inconsistent with everything else, as totally wrong. Falsification is thus the preferred method to clarify the status of an cognitive act with regard to its validity. I think this preference reflects an awareness of what Popper addressed as the asymmetry of verification and falsification: Two mutually exclusive epistemic alternatives for a single object can not both be true; both might be false, but one of them has to be necessarily false. With successful falsifications the pluralist can thus reduce the number of potentially valid epistemic alternatives. Critique in the context of a pluralistic epistemological model thus prepares the ground for the question, which alternatives would be at all eligible for an integration into the complete vision of a particular object at hand.
Q: What are means of knowledge in Jaina epistemology?
A: Means of knowledge represent types of va... more Q: What are means of knowledge in Jaina epistemology?
A: Means of knowledge represent types of valid and conclúsive cognitive processes.
Q: What is a cognitive process?
A: A cognitive process is the application of consciousness by a sentient agent.
Q: Are there valid but ínconclusive cognitive processes?
A: Apparently, yes.
Q: What is the role of reasoning in Jaina philosophy?
A: Reasoning and argumentation are means to identify inconclusive cognitive
processes.
This paper deals with references to the story of the blind men (andha) who mistake body parts of ... more This paper deals with references to the story of the blind men (andha) who mistake body parts of an elephant (gaja) for the whole and quarrel foolishly about its nature. You are probably all familiar with the stable motif of the story: Image 1: Stable motif of the story of the blind men and the elephant One of the blind men touches a tusk and asserts "An elephant is like a spear", another reaches for an ear and insists it is like a "fan". Others end up with "rope", "wall", "pillar" and "snake" as similes for the elephant's true nature.
-Handout (2 pages) -Paper (7 pages) -Beamer projection ) DOT Münster 2013, Panel "Adaptive Reuse ... more -Handout (2 pages) -Paper (7 pages) -Beamer projection ) DOT Münster 2013, Panel "Adaptive Reuse of Texts, Ideas and Images" Handout Trikha I. An argument in the Vādanyāya VN 8,6-9: idam eva ca pratyakṣasya pratyakṣatvam, yad anātmarūpavivekena svarūpasya buddhau samarpaṇam. ayaṃ punar ghaṭo 'mūlyadānakrayī, yaḥ svarūpaṃ ca nopadarśayati pratyakṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchati. VyN 495, n. 878 : tatra loke jihāsitaṃ suvarṇādi mūlyam ucyate. upāditsitaṃ kṣetragṛhādi paṇyam ity ucyate. tatra mūlyatyāgapūrvakapaṇyasvīkāraḥ krayaḥ. II. Passages with literal correspondences to VN 8,8f. Underlined text corresponds to VN 8,8f. at least in paraphrase. 1. NVTṬ 342,8-10: yad āhuḥ so 'yam amūlyadānakrayī svākāraṃ ca jñāne samarpayati prat yak ṣa tāṃ ca svīkartum icchaty avayavīti tad evaṃ paraṃ praty avayavino 'siddher vipratipattiḥ. 2. TAŚVA 118,25f.: nāntar bahir vāṃśebhyo bhinno 'ṃśī kaścit tattvato 'sti. yo hi pratyak ṣa bud dhāv āt mānaṃ na sam arpayati pratyakṣatāṃ ca svīkaroti, so 'yam amūl ya dā nakra yī ty ayuktikam eva … 3. TAŚVA 118,27f.: tathā ime paramāṇavo nātmanaḥ pratyakṣabuddhau svarūpaṃ samarpayanti pratyakṣatāṃ ca svīkartum utsahanta ity amūlyadānakrayiṇaḥ. 4. TAŚVA 433,10f.: ime punā rūpādayo dravyarahitā evāmūlyadānakrayiṇaḥ svarūpaṃ ca nopadarśa yanti prat yak ṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchantī ti sphuṭam abhidhīyatāṃ. 5. AS 79,12f.: kim avayaviparikalpanayā tasyāmulyadānakrayitvāt. sa hi pratyakṣe svātmā naṃ na samarpayati pratyakṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchatīty amūlyadānakrayī ... 6. AS 176,4f.: ta ime paramāṇavaḥ pratyakṣabuddhāv ātmānaṃ ca na samar pa yanti prat yakṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchantīty amūlyadāna kra yiṇaḥ svāvayavabhinnaikāvayavivat. 7. AS 176,8-10: na caite 'vayavā ayam avayavī samavāyaś cāyam anayor iti trayākāraṃ pratyakṣam anubhūyate sakṛd api, yato 'sāv apy amūlyadānakrayī na syāt, prat -DOT Münster 2013, Handout Trikha, p. 2 yakṣabuddhāv ātmānarpaṇena pratyakṣatāsvīkaraṇāviśeṣāt. tata eva parasparabhinnāvayavāvayavinām api pratyakṣe pratibhāsanād amūlyadānakrayiṇāv uktau samavāyavat. 8. SŚP 21,27f.: ta ime paramāṇavaḥ pratyakṣabuddhāv ātmānaṃ na samarpayanti pratyak ṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchantīty amūlyadānakrayiṇaḥ . 9. SŚP 36,4-6: na caite 'vayavādaya ime 'vayavyādayaḥ samavāyaś ca teṣām ayam iti pratyakṣabuddhau visrasā bhinnāḥ sakṛd api pratīyante pratyakṣatāṃ ca svī kar tum icchan tī ti. te 'mī amūlya dāna krayiṇaḥ prat yakṣabuddhāv ātmānarpaṇena prat yakṣatā svī kara ṇāt . 10. SŚP 45,13f.: tad idaṃ paroditasvarūpaṃ sāmānyaṃ pratyakṣabuddhāv ātmānaṃ na sa marthayati pratyakṣatāṃ ca svīkartum icchatīty amūlyadānakrayitvāt satām upahāsāspadam eva syāt. 11. SD 14,20f.: idaṃ punar mūlyādānakrayi sāmānyam. svarūpaṃ ca nādarśayati pratyak ṣa tāṃ ca svīkartum ic cha ti .
In the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Vidyānandin frequently uses kathañcit, sarvathā, anekānta and ekānta to... more In the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā Vidyānandin frequently uses kathañcit, sarvathā, anekānta and ekānta to demonstrate the supremacy of the Jain's ontology to the ontological theories of other schools of thought. The paper examines in which contexts these terms are used and how they are related to Vidyānandin's version of the Jain's pluralistic epistemological model.
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Papers by Himal Trikha
Proceedings of DOT 2013, Panel: “Adaptive Reuse of Texts, Ideas and Images”. Ed. by Elisa Freschi and Philipp Maas (forthcoming 2015).
Book and Theses by Himal Trikha
The focus of the book is a text section from the Sanskrit work Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā, in which the Jaina scholar Vidyānandin discusses tenets of the Vaiśeṣika, a brahminical philosophical tradition. Vidyānandin refutes the Vaiśeṣika tenets by way of a systematic deconstruction of a key concept in the Vaiśeṣika ontological system, namely, the concept of inherence (samavāya).
In the first part of the book, Vidyānandin’s uncompromising criticism of the Vaiśeşika is taken as an example for philosophical approaches to competing world views and examined in the context of the classical Jaina theory of manifoldness (anekāntavāda). Through the systematic differentiation of several forms of perspectivism it is shown that Vidyānandin’s edifice of thought offers a narrow path between relativism and dogmatism: It represents a form of epistemic pluralism, in which the identification of erroneous epistemic alternatives plays a crucial role for the establishment of valid epistemic alternatives.
The second and third parts of the book contain a critical text and an extensively annotated translation of the text selection from the Satyaśāsanaparīkṣā. Vidyānandin’s arguments are examined against the backdrop of closely related passages from other Sanskrit works of the classical and medieval periods. The methodical analysis of these passages and the determination of their place in the argumentation’s structure allow for the identification of different layers of the text’s composition and reveal Vidyānandin’s specific contribution in a discourse that spanned centuries.
Orders: http://www.istb.univie.ac.at/cgi-bin/sdn/sdn.cgi?order_form=1
Reviews:
J. Soni: Journal of the American Oriental Society 132.4 (2012) p. 695-697.
J.D. Long: Religious Studies Review 39.3 (2013) p. 194.
L. den Boer: Bulletin d’Études Indiennes 31 (2013) p. 267-272.
J. Taber: Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies 55 (2013-2014 [2015]) p. 260-262.
Find table of contents and reading extracts below.
Talks by Himal Trikha
The German talk starts with the question: which forms of false knowledge are permitted in a pluralistic model? In this context, two approaches of Jaina perspectivism will be presented. Firstly, an approach that is prominent today and takes up a pre-classical pattern of reasoning, and secondly, a reflected approach by which the Jainas sought to assert themselves in classical discourses.
Both approaches have in common that false knowledge is addressed as ‘one-sided’ knowledge, but one-sidedness is conceptualised differently. Firstly, one-sided cognition is understood as incomplete cognition that articulates one of several possible epistemic standpoints. It is possible in princple to correct such incomplete perspectives by including other points of view. In the second approach, however, one-sidedness is understood as invalid cognition that infers the nature of a thing on the basis of certain properties, i.e., the inauthentic is misunderstood as the essence here. Such a view cannot be corrected, but must be rejected. The establishment of such a type of misconception brings us back to the basis of ‘our reason’, because in order to clarify the status of an individual insight, we do not have to hope for future rectification, but can decide here and now whether the claim to validity of a particular perspective is rationally reasonable or not.
In both approaches, perspectivity is understood as a basic attribute of human cognition. Therefore, talking about perspectivity here is synonymous with the call to look out for other possible perspectives. In the first approach, further points of view must be sought in order to supplement incomplete perspectives. In the second approach, alternatives to viewpoints that have been exposed as inadequate must be sought in order to be able to articulate the assumed actual state of things. Both approaches were very fruitful for Jaina thought. The first, because the Jainas collected alternative philosophical positions like no other tradition in South Asia and thus preserved them for us later generations; the second, because the attempt to refute opposing positions left numerous non-falsified counter-concepts, which are combined in a world view that includes several points of view. My interpretation of this very dynamic form of perspectivism is as follows: against the background of certain ontological presuppositions, mutually exclusive alternatives are 1) collected, 2) subjected to attempts at falsification and 3) the counterpart to a falsified alternative is set as a valid perspective beside others, to which the same procedure has been applied.
A: Means of knowledge represent types of valid and conclúsive cognitive processes.
Q: What is a cognitive process?
A: A cognitive process is the application of consciousness by a sentient agent.
Q: Are there valid but ínconclusive cognitive processes?
A: Apparently, yes.
Q: What is the role of reasoning in Jaina philosophy?
A: Reasoning and argumentation are means to identify inconclusive cognitive
processes.